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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
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 Blaine Handerhan (“Appellant” or “Handerhan”) 
appeals the District Court’s August 21, 2012 judgment of 
sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment.  Appellant argues that 
the sentence he received for possessing thousands of images 
of child pornography was both procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.  Specifically, Appellant contends that the 
District Court erred by failing to (a) explicitly address his 
request for a downward departure based on mental health 
issues and (b) meaningfully consider the factors enumerated 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Appellant’s arguments 
regarding the unreasonable nature of the relevant Sentencing 
Guidelines provision, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.  Although we affirm 
the District Court’s sentence, finding it both procedurally and 
substantively reasonable, we feel compelled to remind the 
District Court that motions seeking departure should be 
formally decided.  A reviewing court must know from the 
record whether a district judge is indeed exercising his or her 
discretion.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In late 2005, an undercover investigation by the 
Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force–a joint 
organization of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies–determined that a single computer was sharing over 
“1400 images and/or video files of child pornography” 
through a file-sharing program.  (Presentence Investigation 
Report (“PSR”) ¶ 5.)  The Pennsylvania State Police were 
notified and conducted an investigation and learned that the 
computer in question was located in the residence of 
Handerhan, a retired Lieutenant, who served for 25 years in 
the Mount Carmel Police Department.  Thereafter, a search 
warrant was executed on Handerhan’s residence and his 
computer was seized.  An evaluation of the computer 
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revealed that it contained over 6,000 images and video files of 
child pornography, including images of pre-pubescent 
children and other images depicting sadomasochism and 
bondage.  In addition, the forensic analysis of Handerhan’s 
computer revealed that he had configured Shareza, a file 
sharing program, in order to distribute some of the images.   
 Appellant was charged in a two-count indictment in 
October 2010 with distribution of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(A) and 2252A(2)(a), and 
with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A).  Handerhan subsequently pled guilty to 
a single count of possession of child pornography, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).  In the plea 
agreement, the Government agreed to dismiss the distribution 
charge and recommended that Appellant “receive a three-
level reduction in the defendant’s offense level for acceptance 
of responsibility.”  (App. 71.)  The Government otherwise 
reserved the right “to recommend a sentence up to and 
including the maximum sentence of imprisonment and fine 
allowable, together with the cost of prosecution.”  (Id. at 72.) 
 Prior to Handerhan’s sentencing, both parties were 
given copies of the PSR.  The probation officer calculated 
Appellant’s guidelines range as being 151 to 188 months’ 
imprisonment based on an offense level of 34 and a criminal 
history category of 1.1
                                                 
1 The offense level calculation reflected several additions 
to the base offense level, including the fact that some of the 
material involved pre-pubescent minors, that the offense 
involved portrayals of “sadistic or masochistic conduct or 
other depictions of violence,” that “the defendant used a 
computer for the possession” of the child pornography, and 
  “[H]owever, because the statutory 
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maximum penalty [was] 10 years, the guideline sentence” 
was set at 120 months.  (PSR ¶ 63.)  The PSR also stated that 
there were no identifiable “factors warranting a departure 
from the guideline range.” (Id. at ¶ 79.)  Appellant filed a 
sealed Sentencing Memorandum in response, requesting that 
“the Court apply a downward departure” and arguing that a 
sentence of 60 months was more appropriate.  (App. 28, 38.)  
Appellant requested the downward departure under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5H1.32 and argued that the proposed 120-month sentence 
was unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.3
                                                                                                             
that “the offense involved 600 or more images.”  (PSR ¶¶ 18-
23.) 
  
2 In relevant part, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3 states: “Mental and 
emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether 
a departure is warranted, if such conditions, individually or in 
combination with other offender characteristics, are present to 
an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical 
cases covered by the guidelines.” 
 
3 In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) includes the 
following factors:  “(1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed [in light of the 
defendant’s and society’s interests]; (3) the kinds of sentences 
available; (4)  the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
established for [the applicable category of offenses]; (5) any 
pertinent policy statement [by the Sentencing Commission]; 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to 
any victims of the offense.” 
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 Appellant argued that a downward departure pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3 was appropriate “in light of the fact that 
he suffers from a mental health condition and has taken 
extraordinary measures to rehabilitate himself.”  (Id. at 28.)  
According to Appellant, and supported by various medical 
documents submitted to the District Court, he suffers from 
obsessive compulsive disorder coupled with an “internet 
addiction,” manifesting itself in an uncontrollable urge to 
download and catalogue pornographic images of all kinds.  
(Id. at 17-18.)  Appellant’s mental illnesses resulted in 
Appellant giving into the urge to download thousands of child 
pornographic images and video, and to store and 
“meticulously catalogue[]” them on his home computer.  (Id. 
at 18.)  Shortly after the police searched his home, Appellant 
sought treatment from multiple psychiatrists, searching for 
the most effective treatment.  According to all of his 
psychiatric evaluations, Appellant did not exhibit any sexual 
attraction to children, nor did he apparently seek out the 
images in question for purposes of gratifying his sexual urges.  
(See id.)   
 Appellant also argued that the proposed Guidelines 
sentence was inappropriate in light of the § 3553(a) factors.  
Specifically, Appellant argued that the sentence was 
inappropriate because: (a) he recognized that what he did was 
wrong; (b) he acted under compulsion of his mental disorder; 
(c) he sought treatment for his malady; (d) the Government’s 
proposed sentence was appropriate in the “ordinary” case, not 
in Appellant’s unique circumstances; and (e) Appellant’s 
status as a father and devoted son militated against his long-
term incarceration.  (See id. at 33-38.) 
 The District Court subsequently held a sentencing 
hearing in August 2012.  At the hearing, both parties argued 
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the merits of Appellant’s request for a downward departure, 
as well as the evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors, with the 
Government suggesting that if the District Court were 
inclined to agree, that it should “exercise its discretion to 
deny the downward departure, but consider all of [Appellant’s 
arguments] in the context of the § 3553(a) factors for a 
variance.”  (Id. at 120.)  After both sides made their 
respective arguments, the District Court ruled as follows: 
 Well, needless to say, this is a very very 
unfortunate situation for you, Mr. Handerhan.  
You did the right thing at least, you 
acknowledged your participation in this ugly 
crime.  And what I am concerned about in all of 
these child pornography cases is the fact that it 
is people who view this and download it and 
distribute it or just look at it, they’re the people 
who perpetuate the ongoing abuse of children 
who are the subjects of these pornography 
images. 
 . . . . 
 The Government is asking for a 10-year 
sentence, which is the statutory maximum and 
is less than the guidelines would provide for 
this offense.  In considering [Appellant’s 
counsel’s] presentation, I am somewhat 
impressed under 3553(a) factors that a variance 
could be granted in this case based upon what 
we’ve discussed here this morning and those 
factors that have been mentioned. 
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 Considering all of those factors, I will 
make a slight variance from the statutory 
maximum penalty in imposing a sentence this 
morning.  I’m sorry that you have to endure 
imprisonment, and I hope that you will be able 
to do that and come back to the community and 
be a law-abiding citizen. 
 Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, 
it is the judgment of the Court on Count 2 that 
the Defendant, Blaine R. Handerhan, is hereby 
committed to the custody of the Bureau of 
Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 96 
months. 
(Id. at 125-27.) 
 Appellant subsequently appealed his sentence, arguing 
that it was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  
Specifically, Appellant posits that the District Court’s failure 
to explicitly rule on his request for downward departure, and 
its allegedly inadequate treatment of the § 3553(a) factors, 
renders his sentence procedurally unreasonable.  According to 
the Appellant, this, in turn, renders his sentence substantively 
unreasonable as well.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
 We review both the procedural and the substantive 
reasonableness of a district court’s sentence for abuse of 
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discretion.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc).  “Appellate review is limited to determining whether 
the sentence is reasonable.”  United States v. Friedman, 658 
F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  Our review 
for reasonableness proceeds in two stages.  First, we must 
“ensure that the [D]istrict [C]ourt committed no significant 
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the [U.S. Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating 
the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on 
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence . . . .”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  Second, if we 
find that the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider 
if it is substantively reasonable given the “totality of the 
circumstances.”  Id.  If the sentence is within the applicable 
Guidelines range, we may presume that the sentence is 
reasonable.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-51 
(2007).  “[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the 
appropriateness of a particular sentence.”  Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 290 (1983).   
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Procedural Unreasonableness 
 When imposing a sentence, a district court must follow 
a three-step process.  First, “[c]ourts must determine to 
calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they 
would have before [United States v. Booker, 453 U.S. 220 
(2005)].”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citations omitted).  Second, district courts “must 
formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties, and stat[e] on 
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the record whether they are granting a departure and how that 
departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into 
account our Circuit’s pre-Booker case law, which continues to 
have advisory force.”  Id. (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).  
Third, districts courts must “exercise[] [their] discretion by 
considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors in setting the 
sentence they impose regardless [of] whether it varies from 
the sentence calculated under the Guidelines.”  Id. (alterations 
in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “During the third step, district courts should engage 
in ‘a true, considered exercise of discretion, including a 
recognition of, and response to, the parties’ non-frivolous 
arguments.’”  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 359 
(3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 
834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
 These steps ensure “that the District Court’s decision-
making process is both logical and fair,” and we therefore 
recommend that the District Court “consider the steps 
separately and sequentially.”  Id. at 361.  Failure to adhere to 
this process may result in a procedurally unreasonable 
sentence, United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214-15 (3d 
Cir. 2010), and may even “risk the substantive reasonableness 
of any decision [the district court] reache[s],” United States v. 
Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 Appellant contends that the District Court’s sentence 
was procedurally unreasonable because it failed to adhere to 
the second and third steps of the Gunter process.4
                                                 
4 Appellant does not challenge the District Court’s initial 
calculation of his Guidelines range pursuant to step one of the 
Gunter process.  At the sentencing hearing, Appellant’s 
  Appellant 
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also challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable, 
arguing that the District Court’s alleged procedural errors 
render the substance of his sentence unreasonable or that, in 
the alternative, “no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on [Appellant] for the reasons the 
district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (3d Cir. 
2009).  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the 
District Court’s sentence and find it both procedurally and 
substantively reasonable.   
1.  Gunter Step 2 - Failure to Formally Rule On 
Downward Departure Request 
 Appellant challenges his sentence by asserting that the 
District Court did not formally rule on his motion for a 
downward departure.  As previously stated, step two of the 
Gunter process requires district courts to “formally rul[e] on 
the motions of both parties, and stat[e] on the record whether 
they are granting a departure . . . .”Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The need for a clear 
ruling is particularly acute regarding a motion for a 
downward departure from the Guidelines because “[o]ur 
Court’s jurisdiction to review the denial of such departures 
depend[s] on a district court’s reason for denial.”  Jackson, 
467 F.3d at 838.  That is, if the court denied the motion 
because it “believed [it] could not legally depart on the 
ground asserted, we [have] jurisdiction to review for legal 
error; if, instead, [the court] recognized [its] authority to 
depart but chose not to do so, we lack[] jurisdiction to review 
that decision.” Id. at 838.   
                                                                                                             
attorney conceded that they did not wish to “dispute a point 
addition on the guidelines calculation,” because “it is really 
not important for today’s purposes.”  (App. 109.) 
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 As a result, we generally require that district courts 
“state expressly whether [their] denial of [a] defendant’s 
departure request was based on legal or discretionary 
grounds.”  Id. at 838-39 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(noting that the rule is still applicable, even post-Booker).  
Thus, where the “district court’s stated reasons are 
ambiguous–so that the record does not reflect whether the 
court’s denial is based on legal or discretionary grounds–then 
the proper remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for 
the district court to clarify the basis for its ruling.”  Stevens, 
223 F.3d at 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 The admonition against ambiguous rulings on 
downward departure requests is not ironclad, however.  Both 
before and after Booker, this Circuit has recognized its ability 
to “infer meaning from the District Court’s actions” in a case.  
Jackson, 467 F.3d at 840.  Thus, even where the district court 
does not explicitly rule on a motion for downward departure, 
this Court has held that it will “not remand for re-sentencing 
when the Government’s arguments to the district court 
concede[d] the plausibility of the downward departure.”  Id. 
at 839 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In Jackson, and in similar 
circumstances, we found it “quite likely that the district 
court’s refusal to depart . . . was discretionary, and thus [this 
Court could] infer that the departure motion had been denied 
by the [district] court in recognition of its ability to depart had 
it chosen to do so.”  Id. at 839 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  While we have applied this 
rationale several times since the 2006 opinion in Jackson, 
“having to infer the District Court’s thinking is not our 
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preferred course.”  Id. at 840 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 In this case, Appellant argues that the District Court 
erred in failing to (1) acknowledge that it had discretion to 
depart; (2) consider the substance of Appellant’s downward 
departure request; and (3) formally rule on that request.  
(Appellant Br. 23.)  “By failing to consider and formally rule 
upon Mr. Handerhan’s argument that the addiction itself was 
sufficiently contributory to his commission of the offense to 
entitle him to a downward departure, the District Court 
created no record to support a thorough consideration of [the] 
motion for downward departure.”  (Id.)  We agree with the 
Appellant that the District Court did not explicitly deny 
Appellant’s request for a downward departure.  Nonetheless, 
we are able to infer that the District Court used its discretion 
because it was fully informed on the issues prompting the 
request, and the Government requested that “the Court 
exercise its discretion to deny the downward departure . . . .” 
(App. 120.)  This demonstrates that the Government 
acknowledged that the District Court had discretion to grant a 
possible departure.  As a result, we find that the District Court 
did use its discretion to deny the request for a downward 
departure, choosing instead to grant a slight variance.   
 As previously noted, this Court’s jurisdiction to 
consider Appellant’s arguments depends on the basis for the 
District Court’s ruling.  See Stevens, 223 F.3d at 247-48 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  “If the ruling was based on the district court’s 
belief that a departure on the grounds proffered by the 
defendant was legally impermissible, we have jurisdiction to 
determine whether the district court’s understanding of the 
law was correct.  By contrast, if the district court’s ruling was 
based on an exercise of discretion, we lack jurisdiction.”  Id. 
14 
 
at 247 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Therefore, it is imperative that this Court understand the basis 
for the District Court’s ruling.  In this case, because we find 
that the District Court utilized its discretion, “[w]e do not 
have jurisdiction to review [the] discretionary decision[] by 
[the] district court[] to not depart downward.”  United States 
v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
2.  Gunter Step 3 – Procedural Unreasonableness   
 While we do not have jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s resolution of Appellant’s downward 
departure request, “[o]ur lack of review on this issue . . . goes 
no further than step two of Gunter, as step three requires our 
review of the sentence against the several § 3553(a) factors, 
only one of which is the Guidelines range.” Jackson, 467 F.3d 
at 839 n.6.  The District Court “need not ‘discuss and make 
findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors,’” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2010)), 
but we do inquire as to whether the District Court gave 
“‘meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) 
factors.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 
216 (3d Cir. 2008)).  See also United States v. Lofink, 564 
F.3d 232, 238 n.13 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Although district courts 
must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, they need not 
explicitly comment on every factor if the record makes clear 
the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Though we “can 
articulate no uniform threshold for sufficiency because of the 
fact-bound nature of each sentencing decision, we certainly 
always demand more than a rote recitation of the § 3553(a) 
factors . . . .”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.   
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 Here, Appellant argues that the District Court 
neglected to address his arguments “(1) that the Sentencing 
Commission did not employ its characteristic empirical 
approach in setting guideline ranges for crimes involving 
child pornography and (2) that the enhancements in the 
Sentencing Guidelines, which were applicable in this case, 
are inherent in almost all offenses involving child 
pornography.”  (Appellant Br. 25.)  The Government 
contends that while “the district court did not recite every 
sentencing factor verbatim, the record clearly demonstrates 
that the court took all of the factors into consideration.”  
(Appellee Br. 15.) 
 We find that the District Court did consider 
§ 3553(a)(1): “the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”  The 
District Court took into account that Appellant had been a 
productive member of society having served as a police 
officer, as well as the fact that he made “a serious and sincere 
effort to overcome” his mental illnesses by seeking therapy.  
(See App. 126.)   
 Likewise, the District Court also considered many 
aspects of § 3553(a)(2): “the need for the sentence imposed 
[in light of the defendant’s and society’s interests].”  The 
District Court considered the broader societal ills flowing 
from the possession of child pornography, and in large 
measure the District Court focused its sentencing discussion 
on the need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and to “deter others generally from 
engaging in this crime.” (See App. 125-26.)  This suggests 
that the District Court also considered § 3553(a)(3) – “the 
kinds of sentences available.”  
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 The Government also argues that the District Court 
adequately considered two other factors – § 3553(a)(4) and 
§ 3553(a)(6).  The first, § 3553(a)(4), looks to the “kinds of 
sentence and the sentencing range established for [the 
applicable category of offenses].”  The District Court 
observed that although Handerhan’s sentence was statutorily 
capped at ten years, the advisory guidelines range for his 
offense before the statutory cap was actually higher.”  (Id.)  
The second, § 3553(a)(6), looks to “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct.”  The Government posits that the following District 
Court statement suffices: “[E]ight years . . . is a long time 
. . . .  But in light of all the circumstances that I have learned 
in this case, in fairness to the other people that I sentence . . . 
a penalty that is significant is appropriate in this case.”  (Id. at 
131.)  We agree that this statement appears to consider 
§ 3553(a)(6) because of the reference to the appropriateness 
of the sentence as it relates to similarly situated defendants 
sentenced by this District Court. 
 Appellant also argues that his sentence is procedurally 
unreasonable “because the District Court failed to consider 
and formally rule upon Mr. Handerhan’s motion for 
downward variances based on flaws in the sentencing 
guidelines.”  Specifically, “the Sentencing Commission’s 
failure to enact guidelines based on empirical research, 
focusing instead on Congressional directives, as is not its 
institutional role.” (Appellant Br. 13.)  Appellant argues that 
United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008) should 
govern.  In Sevilla, this Circuit found the sentencing 
procedure of the district court to be unreasonable because it 
failed to address the defendant’s arguments regarding his 
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childhood and the crack/powder disparity within the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at 232. 
 However, as Appellant acknowledges, the District 
Court did state, “I think that some of these penalties for this 
offense are more serious than they need to be.” (App. 131.)  
The District Court then went on to say, “But in light of all the 
circumstances that I have learned in this case . . . I think . . . 
that a penalty that is significant is appropriate in this case.”  
(Id.)  This demonstrates, albeit not as formally as we would 
prefer, that the District Court did consider arguable problems 
in the sentencing guidelines but found the sentence, when 
coupled with the variance ultimately granted, to be 
appropriate. 
 Here, the District Court’s consideration of the 
§ 3553(a) factors appears to be more comprehensive than in 
Jackson where we found sufficient the district court’s 
statement that it considered the defendant’s prior convictions 
for crimes of violence, circumstances of defendant’s 
upbringing, and financial circumstances was sufficient 
discussion of the § 3553(a) factors.  Jackson, 467 F.3d at 841-
42.   
 The District Court said, “I am somewhat impressed 
under the § 3553(a) factors that a variance could be granted in 
this case based upon what we’ve discussed here this morning 
and those factors that have been mentioned.  Considering all 
of those factors, I will make a slight variance from the 
statutory maximum penalty . . . .”  (App. 126.)  The District 
Court granted Appellant a 24-month downward variance, in 
apparent recognition of Appellant’s mental health issues and 
his efforts at treatment, stating, “I think you have made an 
effort to overcome your addiction.”  (Id. at 125-26.)  We find 
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that the District Court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors 
was “more than a rote recitation of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .” 
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  Accordingly, the District Court did 
not err in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors applicable 
to Appellant.  The totality of the record demonstrates that at 
Gunter step three, all of the factors were sufficiently 
considered by the District Court and reflected in the variance 
ultimately granted.  We find that the District Court did not 
commit procedural error in its sentencing. 
B. Substantive Unreasonableness 
 Having concluded that the District Court committed no 
procedural error, we now review the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  We will affirm a 
procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable 
“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the district court provided.”  Id. at 568.  In reviewing the 
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we look to “whether 
the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible 
statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious 
consideration of the relevant factors.”  United States v. 
Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We focus on the 
totality of the circumstances, and the party challenging the 
sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence’s 
unreasonableness.”  Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360.   
 Appellant argues that “based upon the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed a sentence of 96 months considering all 
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors as advocated by 
[Appellant] at sentencing.” (Appellant Br. 37.)  In the instant 
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case, the correct procedure was employed and a reasonable 
conclusion reached given the evidence presented.  The facts 
do not suggest that no other court would impose a similar 
sentence.  Appellant is a former police officer who–by his 
own admission–was aware that the images he downloaded 
were illegal.  (App. 18 (noting, in the Sentencing 
Memorandum, that Appellant “knew child pornography was 
wrong”).)  Moreover, his avowed explanation–that his 
obsessive compulsive disorder, coupled with his “internet 
addiction” drove him to download thousands of images of 
child pornography–does not account for why some of those 
images were then subsequently shared online by Appellant 
via the Shareza software.  (Id. 17-18.)  Finally, while it is true 
that Appellant sought treatment for his condition (a factor that 
the District Court considered in sentencing Appellant), he 
expended such efforts only after his arrest.  (Id. 17-22.)  Due 
to these factors, we find that a reasonable sentencing court 
could have imposed the same sentence upon Appellant.   
 Furthermore, reviewing courts are entitled to presume 
that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable.  
Rita, 551 U.S. at 364.  In this case, Appellant received a 
below Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment.  
Under the deferential standard of review, the challenge to the 
length of imprisonment fails.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Today we affirm the District Court’s ruling and find 
that Handerhan’s sentence was neither procedurally nor 
substantively unreasonable.  Nonetheless, having to infer that 
the District Court used its discretion to deny a downward 
departure on the basis that the Government addressed the 
downward departure is not our “preferred course.”  Jackson, 
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467 F.3d at 839-40.  We should not have to venture down that 
path only to conclude that we have no jurisdiction to review 
the district court’s discretionary denial of a downward 
departure.  We want to be certain of the reason a district court 
judge denied a downward departure.  We have provided 
specific guidance in Gunter and its progeny and that 
precedent must be followed. 
